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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective: The paper presents a legal analysis of R2P in light of contemporary 
international law. It questions whether R2P is lawful as a just war (jus bellum justum) 
doctrine under international law, specifically under the general prohibition for the use 
of force pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations. The paper first analyzes the 
just war doctrine in light of international law; thereafter, there is a study of the legal 
framework for the use of force in the United Nations Charter; and, in a third step, the 
study of the R2P in legal light as a just war doctrine.  
 
Methodology: The research is executed through a deductive approach, its scientific 
objective is exploratory, and its research technique is a bibliographical and 
documentary survey. The methodological limit is in a legal approach of the subject 
from a normative perspective, focused on the legal validity of the institute under 
international law.    
 
Results: It is concluded from the study that R2P has legal flaws and does not stand 
against United Nations Charter regulation on the usage of force, notably the norm 
that states that the use of force in international relations is an exclusive responsibility 
of the United Nations Security Council.  
 
Contributions: The study shows its pertinence as an endeavor into a strictly legal 
analysis of a complex and highly political subject of humanitarian interventions. 
 
Keywords: Responsibility to protect; humanitarian intervention; just war doctrine;  
United Nations Security Council. 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Objetivo: O artigo apresenta uma análise jurídica da R2P à luz do Direito 
Internacional contemporâneo; questiona se a R2P é juridicamente válida como uma 
doutrina de guerra justa (jus bellum justum) sob o Direito Internacional, 
especificamente à luz da proibição geral de uso da força de acordo com a Carta das 
Nações Unidas. Para tanto, o artigo analisa a doutrina da guerra justa à luz do 
Direito Internacional; em seguida, estuda o marco legal para o uso da força na Carta 
da ONU; e, em terceiro lugar, estuda a R2P como uma doutrina de guerra justa. 
 
Metodologia: A pesquisa é executada através de abordagem dedutiva, seu objetivo 
científico é exploratório e sua técnica de pesquisa é bibliográfica e documental. O 
limite metodologia é uma abordagem legal do seu objeto em uma perspectiva 
normativa com foco na validade legal do instituto à luz do Direito Internacional. 
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Resultados: Conclui-se do estudo que a R2P tem falhas jurídicas e não se coaduna 
com a normativa da Carta das Nações Unidas sobre o uso da força, notadamente a 
norma que estabelece que o uso da força nas relações internacionais é uma 
responsabilidade quase exclusiva do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.  
 
Contribuições: O estudo mostra sua pertinência por se tratar de análise 
estritamente legal de um assunto complexo e altamente político que são as 
intervenções humanitárias. 
 
Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade de proteger; intervenção humanitária; doutrina 
da guerra justa; Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. 
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper aims to study the contemporary “just war” (jus bellum justum) 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention: Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It questions 
whether R2P is lawful (i.e., legally valid) as a just war doctrine under international 
law, specifically under the general prohibition for the use of force pursuant to the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN). That is the main research question (research 
problem). The preliminary hypothesis is that — despite some political and ideological 
argumentation — from a legal standpoint, R2P is defective, given that it contradicts 
the Charter’s legal framework for the use of force. Thus, the main objective is to 
present a legal analysis of R2P in light of international law. As intermediary 
objectives, it intends to: (i) consider broad just war doctrine in the light of 
contemporary international law; (ii) analyze the legal framework for the use of force in 
the UN Charter; and (iii) study R2P as a just war doctrine. Regarding the 
methodology chosen, the research is executed through a deductive approach, its 
scientific objective is exploratory, and its research technique is a bibliographical and 
documentary survey.  
It is paramount to observe that this research finds its methodological limits in 
a legal approach of the subject from a normative perspective focused on the legal 
validity of the institute under international law. Therefore, in this paper, the scientific 
interest is purely legal, and, likewise, so are the conclusions. It is a juristic — not a 
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political — approach to the problems at hand. The paper deals with the law in effect 
over the institutes it considers, not with its actual or desired role in the international 
play of powers.1 Nonetheless, the study at hand shows its pertinence as an endeavor 
into a strictly legal analysis of a complex and highly political subject: humanitarian 
interventions.2 In this sense, the research attempts to shed legal light into a matter 
which holds high relevance to the international protection of human rights. 3 
Furthermore, other than the Middle East (which is a constant subject of these military 
actions), there are currently active discussions in the Permanent Council of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) concerning the “need” for intervention in 
Latin-America over the crisis in Venezuela under the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca, TIAR or 
“Tratado de Río”) (OAS, 2019b). 
 
 
2  THE FORMULA FOR THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE 
  
There is no arguing against the mainstream conviction that war is a terrible 
ordeal. This perception is confirmed by the early writings of both Horace 4  and 
Herodotus,5 who warned their listeners and future generations of the perils caused by 
war. Nevertheless, waring is a perennial condition of humankind, and conflicts can be 
considered a natural progression of relations between different groups of individuals, 
ranging from small tribes to modern states. In order to adjust to this paradoxical 
situation — the horror of war and its inexorable condition — there have been many 
efforts to justify the use of force. That is, even if it is a terrible decision, according to 
 
1 On the legal interpretation of international law, see (KELSEN, 1951). 
2 On a postcolonial critique of R2P, see (MAHDAVI, 2015). 
3 For the purposes herein, human rights are understood as the sum of civil, politic, economic, social, 
cultural, and collective rights stipulated by international and regional instruments and international 
customary law (PETERKE, 2009, p. 86-87).  
4 “Many delight in the camp, in the sound of the trumpet mingled with the clarion, and in the wars that 
mothers hate.” (HORACE, 1995, p. 5). 
5 “No man is so foolish as to desire war more than peace: for in peace sons bury their fathers, but in 
war fathers bury their sons”. (HERODOTUS, 1975, p. 113). 
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those who defend it, it is not always the worst option to go to war. The reasons held 
vary dramatically along the millennia, but the efforts of argumentation are still 
constant.  
An illustrative case of mythical arguments of both divinity and Natural Law 
are the ones brought forward in the “Iliad” through its contemplation on the honor of 
men (“kleos” or “κλέος”).6  More than an epic poem, the document represents an 
amalgamation of a cultural perspective that has profound implications into the 
understanding of Law and morality for that particular society. In this sense, the 
arguments raised by the characters can be a source for understanding a vision into 
what that war represented and whether if that conflict was justified (ROISMAN, 2008, 
p. 100). Even if the arguments have a mythical and (probably) fictitious origin, they 
are still a fruitful source for us to draft a theoretical definition for the formula of the 
just war doctrine. Considering, on the one hand, a hypothetical situation where legal 
rights or assets protected by law are subject to violation or risk of an imminent 
breach, and, on the other hand, the intrinsic terribleness of war, is the conflict 
justifiable? If the rights or assets outweigh the risks and foreseeable losses of war, 
there is a casus belli, i.e., there is a situation that justifies war (it is a “just war”). If not, 
then no, that war is not just and, in a legal system which adopts the doctrine, the 
declaration of war would be a priori unlawful.  
Throughout legal history, the formula evolved, changing what rights and 
assets were relevant enough to justify the conflict: honor, divine will, land claims, 
human rights. However, the same pragmatic formula persists within the just war 
doctrine. For instance, weighting war against the native populations of the Americas, 
citing Saint Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria concludes that the denial of the 
Christian faith was not enough of a cause to justify conflict between the European 
 
6 “Mother tells me, the immortal goddess Thetis with her glistening feet, that two fates bear me on to 
the day of death. If I hold out here and I lay siege to Troy, my journey home is gone, but my glory 
never dies. If I voyage back to the fatherland I love, my pride, my glory dies... true, but the life that's 
left me will be long, the stroke of death will not come on me quickly.” (HOMER, 1991, p. 265). “[…] the 
men whom Zeus decrees, from youth to old age, must wind down our brutal wars to the bitter end until 
we drop and die, down to the last man.” (HOMER, 1991, p. 372). 
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princes and the Amerindians (VITORIA, 2010, p. 270-271). Hence, similar to the 
discussion in the Iliad as to whether the Greeks were justified for going to war against 
the Trojans, in Vitoria, the formula remains similar. The substantial difference is the 
legally protected right (or asset) in the two cases: Honor in the former, salvation 
through the Christian faith in the latter. In Hugo Grotius the evolution continues 
through his attempt to remove ideological considerations as justification for a just 
war, systematizing what he believes are the just causes for war. War is justified when 
for defense, for the recovery of one’s property or one’s debt, or for the punishment of 
an offense committed (GROTIUS, 2005, p. 393). However, even then, the formula 
above remains true.  
   
 
3  JUST WAR DOCTRINE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Within the “Peace of Westphalia” non-intervention paradigm, there is 
subsequent difficulty in recognizing a concept of just war in line with what was stated 
above (GROSS, 1948). That is not to say that there were no more conflicts. However, 
considering the equal status of states, they were no longer in clear a position to judge 
whether another state’s cause was just or not (SHAW, 2017, p. 853). Historical 
progression reaches the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not prohibit war entirely. It created 
a set of procedural and temporary rules that had to be followed by the member-
states, but it allowed war if it was necessary for the maintenance of right and justice 
(Articles 12 and 15 of the League Covenant). The Kellogg-Briand Pact, on its turn, 
prohibited war as an instrument of national policy (Article 1). Among others, Hans 
Kelsen interprets that the Pact — a contrario sensu — does not prohibit war as an 
instrument of international policy, i.e., the use of force is not forbidden as a means of 
international politics and, above all, that it is not a reaction against the violation of 
international law, nor as an instrument to maintain and realize international law 
(KELSEN, 1996, p. 62). 
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Nevertheless, the substantial unfolding of the rules for defining just war can 
be felt through the signature of the UN Charter, where the peaceful settlement of 
disputes was universally recognized as a peremptory principle to be observed by the 
states in their international relations. Article 2.4 of the Charter is definite. In their 
international relations, all member-states shall refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Also, Article 2.6 
of the Charter goes as far as ruling that even states which are not members of the 
UN must act per the UN rules on the use of force to maintain international peace and 
security. Moreover, in the Charter, the word “war” is not present in any of its Articles 
(KELSEN, 1952, p. 29), appearing only once its Preamble while it refers to the 
scourges caused by the two World Wars.  
Legally, the Charter replaces “war” with “use of force”. As a broader concept, 
the use of force encompasses what is understood as war. As defined by Kelsen 
(1952, p. 32), war is a coercive action between states. Bilateral (attack and counter-
attack) or unilateral (without reaction), and in line with the Westphalian paradigm: 
War is an affair of states.7 The use of force, on the other hand, makes no such 
subjective requirements. Any individual or collective can be responsible for the use of 
force, be it a state, an international organization, an organ of such — e.g., the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) — or even a terrorist group (MARCOS, 2018, p. 
57).  
Going even further than its predecessors, the UN Charter obligates the 
member-states not only not to resort to the use of force but to refrain from the threat 
of the use of force, legally binding them to settle their disputes by peaceful means. 
The only legal exceptions for this general prohibition on the use of force are the 
“enforcement actions” divided into three categories. (i) Use of force as a reaction of 
the UN itself, through the UNSC’s Chapter VII powers, in the face of a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Article 39). (ii) As an extraordinary 
 
7 Contemporary scholars argue that it is theoretically possible to recognize the existence of “war” 
between a State and non-State entities such as urban insurgencies and criminal organizations in a 
Humanitarian Law perspective (PETERKE, 2010). 
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and provisional measure of self-defense that must be immediately informed to the 
UNSC so it can exercise its authority (Article 51). (iii) Moreover, as a historical 
remnant, the UN Charter permits action against an enemy state of the Second World 
War (Article 107). The usage of force is reserved to the UNSC, the only authority in 
contemporary international law which can use force in a definite and lawful manner 
against members-states as well as non-members (KELSEN, 1948, 785). Even self-
defense — which, at first, could be considered an exception to the UNSC’s monopoly 
— is, as mentioned, implemented on a provisional basis. According to the UN 
Charter, force can only be used in the case of “immediate” self-defense, i.e., 
instantaneous, proportional, and temporary, in an attempt to contain the aggression 
previously suffered. Also, the states must immediately notify the UNSC of the action 
so the Council may decide by itself what are the future appropriate measures 
(SORTO, 2005, p. 149). In this sense, scholars refer to the conclusion reached by 
the International Court of Justice in the “Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda 
Case” (ICJ, 2005, p. 222). There is no clause considering the gravity of the situation 
or its complexity as a possible exception. Regardless of the dimension of the 
international conundrum, in the Charter, there are no legal grounds for the use of 
force other than the exceptions placed above (MENEZES, 2013, p. 111). It can even 
be said that the prohibition on the use of force is a peremptory norm of the jus 
cogens status (LINDERFALK, 2016, p. 52-53; ICJ, 1986, p. 90-91).  
In this sense, considering the general prohibition of its usage in international 
relations, the case for a just war doctrine in the light of the UN Charter is left on a 
second level. Nonetheless, Kelsen presents an argument in favor of a just war 
doctrine within the Charter. However, the depiction presented by the author is 
considerably objective. It has no elements considering the gravity of the violation of 
the legal right or asset as the classic formula given above. In Kelsen’s view, the jus 
bellum justum doctrine is expressed as follows:  
 
 
[…] according to general international law war is in principle forbidden; it is 
permitted only as a reaction against an international delict and only when 
directed against the responsible for this delict. Like reprisals, war has to be a 
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sanction if it is not to be considered a delict. This is the doctrine of bellum 
justum, just war. If the doctrine of bellum justum is correct, then under 
general international law the employment of force on the part of one state 
against another is in principle forbidden as a delict; but it is exceptionally 
allowed as a reaction against a delict, that is to say, as a sanction (KELSEN, 
1951, p. 707).  
 
 
According to Kelsen, it is possible to interpret the enforcement action case for 
the use of force as a reaction of the UN itself (through the UNSC’s Chapter VII 
powers) as a sanction applied by the organization against the unlawful state 
responsible for the threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. In 
this case, in Kelsen’s view, the UN Charter adopts a form of just war doctrine 
(KELSEN, 1951, p. 708). Nonetheless, his just war doctrine has less margin for 
ponderation. It is a simplified binary formula (ZOLO, 1998, p. 312). If the use of force 
(or war) is in accordance with the legal grounds authorized by the UN Charter 
(notably the use of force by collective action through Chapter VII powers), it is a just 
war. Outside of the realm of legal categories, it is unlawful. Moreover, in this last 
case, the illegal war is in itself a case that authorizes the use of force by collective 
action. Whether one accepts or disapproves of Kelsen’s attempt to re-propose the 
just war doctrine, it seems intuitive that, under contemporary international law, the 
lawful use of force is one that meets the requisites presented by the UN Charter. If it 
falls outside of that threshold, it is unlawful, i.e., in disagreement with the legal rules 
in effect.  
  
 
4  HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION THROUGH R2P  
  
Humanitarian intervention can be understood when a state (or a collective of 
states) decides to militarily interfere in the realm of another state’s sovereignty in 
order to, allegedly, protect the rights of persons situated within this latter state from a 
violation (GRANT; BARKER, 2004, p. 268). It is a political concept that outdates 
human rights as a legal institute. For one, Oppenheim refers to the intervention 
perpetrated by Britain, France, and Russia in 1827 in the struggle between 
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revolutionary Greece and Turkey, given the public opinion surrounding the cruelties 
committed during the struggle (OPPENHEIM, 1912, p. 426).  Some scholars argue 
that humanitarian interventions draw its appeal from the revolutionary discourse of 
human rights and the — conjectural — idea that humanitarian intervention is an 
instrument capable of enacting emancipatory ideals, freedom from oppression, and 
fundamental respect for human dignity (ORFORD, 2003, p. 34). On the other hand, it 
is possible to argue that humanitarian intervention is an oxymoron that serves as a 
pretext for selective military interventions with uncertain results (BADESCU, 2011, p. 
2). 
From a contemporary legal standpoint, arguments in favor of humanitarian 
intervention through the use of force must stand in accordance with the UN Charter. 
Especially the norms presented above that state the legal grounds for the use of 
force. In this sense, humanitarian interventions are permissible if they are following 
the UN Charter. Thus, a priori, humanitarian interventions are a matter that should be 
decided by the UN through the UNSC Chapter VII powers. However, following the 
premise of the monopoly of the UNSC on the use of force, and the failures of the 
international community to adequately respond to the crisis in Rwanda and Bosnia in 
the 1990s, former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan questioned this paradigm:  
 
 
Some critics were concerned that the concept of “humanitarian intervention” 
could become a cover for gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states. […] But to the critics I would pose this question: if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of 
our common humanity? We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree 
that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are 
principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle 
should prevail when they are in conflict. (ANNAN, 2000, p. 48) 
 
 
To examine the matter, the Canadian Government funded the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which published a report 
on their newly established institute, the “Responsibility to Protect”, a reinterpretation 
of state sovereignty to state responsibility (ICISS, 2001b).  This is the core principle 
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of R2P. It comprehends state sovereignty as a responsibility, proposing that the core 
responsibility of states for the protection of its people lies within the state of which 
territory those individuals are (state obligations inherent in the concept of territorial 
sovereignty). However, there is a secondary responsibility that arises when some 
state fails to fulfill its primary responsibility. Where a population is subject to human 
rights violations arising from war, insurgency, repression or general state failure and 
the state is unable or unwilling to act, the rule of non-intervention yields to the 
secondary responsibility to protect which the whole international community is 
subject (ICISS, 2001a, p. 5-12). 
Nonetheless, R2P is arguably a broader concept than just military 
humanitarian intervention. It presents a framework that includes preventive non-
military action as one of its most important dimensions (EVANS, 2008, p. 56). The 
Responsibility to Protect is divided into three categorical “responsibilities”. (i) The 
Responsibility to Prevent: the obligation to address the root and direct causes for 
future internal conflicts and crises that could place populations at risk (ICISS, 2001b, 
p. 19). (ii) The Responsibility to React: the obligation to respond to situations of 
compelling humanitarian need with appropriate measures, including sanctions, 
international prosecution, and military intervention. (ICISS, 2001b, p. 29). (iii) The 
Responsibility to Rebuild: the obligation to provide, after the intervention, assistance 
for recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation (ICISS, 2001b, p. 39). Thus, it is 
possible to argue that R2P proposes a new regulation for humanitarian intervention 
(i.e., humanitarian intervention through responsibility to protect). Nonetheless, the 
institute does not limit itself on jus ad bellum. 
Considering proper humanitarian intervention through R2P, the document 
proposed by the ICISS presents a “just cause threshold”. It states that military 
intervention for the protection of human rights is an exceptional and extraordinary 
measure. To be warranted, there must be a concrete or imminent case of grave 
violation against human rights in at least one of the two kinds. (a) Large scale loss of 
life, with or without genocidal intent, a product of deliberate state action, neglect, or 
inability. (b) Large scale "ethnic cleansing", whether actual or apprehended, through 
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killings, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or sexual aggression (ICISS, 2001b, p. 32). 
Furthermore, the document presents precautionary principles for the use of force. 
These principles include analysis of the “right intention”, i.e., that the primary purpose 
for the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, which (according to the 
ICISS) is better assured through multilateral operations supported by regional opinion 
and the participation of victims. Additionally, humanitarian intervention is only justified 
as a last resort, and when its scale, duration, and intensity is the minimum necessary 
to secure its objectives. Finally, the document states that, for the humanitarian 
intervention to be warranted, there must be a reasonable chance of success through 
military means, i.e., that there is a sufficient correlation between the means and the 
end intended (ICISS, 2001b, p. 35).  
An interesting aspect to be considered is when the document refers to what 
would be the “right authority” for the lawful deflagration of the usage of force in 
international relations. Firstly, the ICISS recognizes that the primary and appropriate 
authority to decide on the use of force is the UNSC. The document states that its 
original intent is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of 
authority but to contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of the UNSC procedure. The 
document emphasizes that Security Council authorization should be sought before 
any action being carried out. On the other hand, it underlines that the UNSC should 
deal promptly with the requests on intervention (ICISS, 2001b, p. 49). Likewise, it 
proposes that the permanent members of the Security Council should commit to 
refrain on applying their Article 27 veto powers in matters related to military 
humanitarian intervention. However, in the event where the UNSC rejects a proposal 
or fails to deal with the issue in a time considered reasonable, the document presents 
two alternative options. (a) Take the matter to be decided by the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure (ICISS, 2001b, 
p. 48). (b) Action within regional or sub-regional international organizations pursuant 
to Article 52, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, subject to ex post facto authorization 
from the UNSC (ICISS, 2001b, p. 54). Finally, the ICISS document presents a set of 
operational principles, including specific rules concerning rules of engagement, 
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coordination with humanitarian organizations, a joint military approach with a unity of 
command, and a clear and unambiguous mandate with clear objectives (ICISS, 
2001b, p. 57). 
Regarding the “Uniting for Peace” alternative, the procedure was first 
established through UNGA Resolution 377 (UNGA, 1950) as an attempt to grant the 
General Assembly secondary responsibility for maintaining international peace 
through an interpretation of the UN Charter. According to Resolution 377, if the 
UNSC fails to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security, the UNGA is authorized to recommend to member-states collective 
measures including the use of armed force (KELSEN, 1951, p. 147). Although the 
“Uniting for Peace” procedure has been used a few times throughout recent practice 
(notably in the case of Namibia’s independence in 1981), a significant number of 
states are reluctant to consider actions taken based on this Resolution as legal 
(WEISS, 2005, p. 30-31).  
In 2005, a re-proposed “Responsibility to Protect” was presented through the 
“World Summit Outcome Document” enshrined in UNGA Resolution 60 of 2005. This 
edition of the Responsibility to Protect, however, is far less creative than the one 
presented by the ICISS. The document urges the international community to take 
action to prevent a humanitarian crisis, mentioning that there is a general 
responsibility to prevent and deal with such situations. However, it presents no 
alternatives to the use of force. It recognizes that collective action through the use of 
force is to be done through the UNSC pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(UNGA, 2005). Considering the focus of this particular research, the World Summit 
Responsibility to Protect poses no evident legal complexities. It is a general 
humanitarian plea directed to the global community, and its content appears to be in 
accordance with Charter law.  
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5  LEGAL COMPLEXITIES ON THE USE OF FORCE THROUGH R2P  
  
Having analyzed the regulation of the use of force in contemporary 
international law through the UN Charter, and having presented the structural 
aspects surrounding the proposed legal usage of force through R2P as proposed by 
the ICISS, this paper will now refer to some aspects of R2P that can raise 
complexities and potential contradictions with the law in effect. Foremost, it seems 
that, at this time, an adequate interpretation is one that understands R2P as “soft 
law”.8 Its aspiration to become international law is, at most, emerging (DORR, 2008, 
p. 207). Even for those who are favorable to its adoption, it is strenuous to admit that 
it is a norm of customary international law, especially considering the resistance and 
critiques over its usage. There is a lack of opinio juris sive necessitatis and state 
practice (HEHIR; MURRAY, 2013, p. 92-93).  
Moreover, as a preliminary standard for a legal interpretation of R2P, it is 
necessary to consider the status of the UN Charter in contemporary international law. 
Due to the provision of Article 103, the Charter holds a position of primacy and 
precedence over general international law. Following the International Court of 
Justice’s “Nicaragua” precedent, this was the understanding of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in the “Kadi v. Commission Case” of 2005, where it decided that 
Charter law prevails over the other norms of international law (COURT OF JUSTICE 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2005, p. 3713). Similarly, in the 1993 “Bosnia Case” of 
the International Court of Justice, Judge Lauterpacht’s separate opinion observed 
that the UN Charter — and, as a result, the UNSC’s Resolutions — hold a special 
status in international law, second only to jus cogens norms. In the justice’s view, 
 
8 “Soft Law. A term used to refer to non-binding instruments or documents which have the appearance 
of law. ‘This is a body of standards, commitments, joint statements or declarations of policy or 
intention (think, for instance of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), resolutions adopted by the UN GA or 
other multilateral bodies, etc. Normally “soft law” is created within international organizations or is at 
any rate promoted by them. It clearly relates to human rights, international economic relations or the 
protection of the environment’ […]. So, while not legally binding, soft law can be politically influential in 
setting down objectives and aspirations which may crystallize into custom or be adopted as treaties. 
[…]” (GRANT; BARKER, 2009, p. 558).   
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only in the event of a violation of jus cogens was it possible to overcome a UNSC 
Resolution acted out according to the UN Charter (ICJ, 1993, p. 440). Hence, the UN 
Charter has a “supremacy clause” that stipulates that the obligations under Charter 
law shall prevail in the event of a conflict over commitments under other international 
agreements (LIIVOJA, 2008). This conclusion is relevant for the analysis because for 
R2P to be considered a valid legal norm in international law, it must be under the UN 
Charter. The Charter creates a minimum normative standard that not only regulates 
but establishes an insurmountable legal framework for any permissible governmental 
activity (TOMUSCHAT, 1992, p. 44). However, it appears that the ICISS’s R2P 
proposal presents some deviancy from the UN Charter’s legal frame. 
 
5.1  THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD 
 
A first complexity concerns RP2’s “just cause threshold”. It seems that, 
alongside its precautionary principles, the just causes are an adaptation of the 
original just war formula. Similar to the historical cases presented, R2P proposes two 
kinds of (human) rights violations that (theoretically) justify a declaration of war. 
However, according to the evolution of the jus bellum justum doctrine already 
examined above, it is possible to conclude that in contemporary international law 
(especially in UN Charter law) there is no legislative gap on the usage of force. If a 
contemporary just war formula is conceivable, it is, as presented by Kelsen, binary 
(legal or illegal). In the light of international law, a just war can be comprehended as 
a hypothesis of the usage of force in following the legal cases set in the UN Charter. 
As a deduction, any usage of force disaccording with the three valid categories of 
enforcement action outlined in the Charter is legally invalid. Even if there are strong 
moral and humanitarian arguments in favor of action, there is no legal clause in the 
UN Charter considering the gravity of the situation or its complexity as a possible 
exception. 
An argument that could be raised by the supporters of R2P is that 
humanitarian intervention is lawfully justified as self-defense. If there is a case for 
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self-defense and simultaneous humanitarian help, at first, the argument seems 
admissible. Consider a frontier conflict with genocidal action and border invasions by 
the guilty state; the innocent state could lawfully exercise its right of self-defense to 
prevent further aggression, and its activity would concurrently provide humanitarian 
aid. Withal, it is relevant to observe the legal limits surrounding pre-emptive self-
defense. Even if the subject matter is far from settled, the “Caroline Case” remains 
critical to understand the legal restrictions surrounding self-defense against imminent 
aggression accurately. As expressed by the US Secretary of State in 1837, the pre-
emptive self-defense is lawful when it is exercised by a state which is facing 
immediate and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means and no moment 
for deliberation (RAYMOND, 2007, p. 100-101).  
In any case, as mentioned, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, self-
defense is implemented on a provisional basis. It can only be used in the case of 
“immediate” self-defense, i.e., instantaneous, proportional, and temporary. 
Furthermore, it must be immediately reported to the UNSC so it can exercise its 
primary and perennial responsibility to maintain international peace and security. 
Hence, it appears that there is no legal basis for ongoing humanitarian intervention 
based on self-defense. A similar critique can be made against R2P's precautionary 
principles. Even if the principles seem persuasive and reasonable, its considerations 
fall outside the legal framework of the UN Charter. ICISS’s states that military 
intervention is justified as a last resort. From a legal viewpoint, even if it is such (the 
last resort), there is no legal basis for the usage of force (unless it is one of the cases 
set forward in the Charter) and, thus, it is unlawful. 
 
5.2 AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF FORCE: UNGA’s “UNITING FOR PEACE” AND 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Another aspect of R2P to be considered are its considerations over the right 
authority for the use of force. The UN Charter is clear: The UNSC is the organ 
responsible for decisions concerning the use of force in international relations. In this 
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sense, the “Uniting for Peace” UNGA procedure is legally problematic. It can be 
argued that the Resolution falls outside the catalog of UNGA functions set on 
Chapter IV of the UN Charter. Strictly, the Charter allows UNGA to consider matters 
and to recommend measures under certain conditions, but not to resolve that it shall. 
In other words, according to the UN Charter, the UNGA is not authorized to confer 
upon itself peremptory or definite powers for deciding matters (KELSEN, 1951, p. 
959-960). Hence, if UNGA were to recommend to member-states to adopt military 
measures, it would be doing so outside the scope of its competence and in an act 
without binding effects. Thus, if a state (or states) were to act following UNGA, they 
would be doing so by their own will and in conflict with international law. In this 
respect, as mentioned, the prohibition on the use of force and the UNSC’s monopoly 
over its usage is a peremptory norm of the jus cogens status. In sum, the “Uniting for 
Peace” procedures are in weak legal grounds (JOHNSON, 2014, p. 115). A suitable 
interpretation of the Charter and UNGA’s responsibility for international peace and 
security would be one that states that if UNGA believes that on a question under its 
consideration, the use of force is necessary, it must refer this matter to the UNSC 
(KELSEN, 1951, p. 962). 
A similar critique can be made against the second alternative offered by the 
ICISS document, i.e., action within regional or sub-regional international 
organizations. The UN Charter does not preclude the validity of regional 
arrangements provided that they are consistent with the Charter itself (given the 
supremacy rule under Article 103 mentioned above). Article 52 of the Charter permits 
these regional organizations to act in the functions of peaceful settlement of local 
disputes. Likewise, regional organizations may act as organs of the UN in taking 
enforcement action under the authority of the UNSC. However, without preceding 
UNSC authorization, enforcement actions under the regional arrangements are only 
permissible in three cases. (i) The general rule of enforcement action in the exercise 
of collective self-defense. (ii) Enforcement action as a measure against enemy states 
of the Second World War. (iii) Usage of force provided for in regional arrangements 
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directed against a renewal of aggressive policy on the part of an enemy state. (See 
Articles 53 and 54 of the UN Charter.)  
The third case is deserving of a detailed analysis. It authorizes regional 
agencies and states under regional arrangements to resort to force against ex-enemy 
states to combat the renewal of an aggressive policy. Thus, enforcement action is 
permissible. There is, however, a temporal restriction: “[…] until such time as the 
Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned […]”. This passage 
means that the states concerned have the right to maintain the status quo for as long 
as they please (or, at least, as long as the UNSC determines that the situation at 
hand is a threat or a breach of international peace or security). However, this norm is 
specifically tailored towards ex-enemy states, i.e., the members of the UN are not 
obliged by the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against ex-enemy 
states (KELSEN, 1951, p. 809-813). Therefore, the Charter does not create an 
exception for “future enemy states”. In this sense, there is an explicit limitation for an 
attempt to interpret it in a way that allows the use of force with motivations that are 
not to prevent the renewal of an aggressive policy by an ex-enemy state. Any attempt 
to do so would fall outside of the UN Charter framework and, analogous to the 
explained above, become unlawful.  
Moreover, the claim favorable to an ex post facto authorization through the 
UNSC ignores a fundamental aspect of the legality on the use of force according to 
the UN Charter. Firstly because (other than the self-defense case) collective 
enforcement action is done through the UNSC, i.e., it is the Security Council that acts 
(even if through states). Secondly, this interpretation ignores the Charter’s gradual 
procedure under Articles 40, 41, and 42, which presents the UNSC with a series of 
legal instruments to be used preliminarily to the use of force. Furthermore, an 
interpretation that considers the ex post facto authorization valid is one that admits 
the risk of a system of continuous and subsequent retaliation. It is similar to what 
Kelsen calls a “vendetta system” (1934, p. 11). If the use of force is admitted with the 
ex post facto rule there is no explicit limitation for the state which is subject to the 
intervention to consider that intervention an unlawful act and, in return, exercise its 
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right of self-defense against the intervening state, which in its turn would retaliate and 
so on.  
Regarding TIAR and the possibility that this treaty is used to justify 
humanitarian intervention through R2P to deal with the contemporary crisis in 
Venezuela, some commentary is fitting. Created during the Cold War, the treaty 
adopts a “hemispheric defense doctrine”, i.e., an attack against one of the member 
states is an act of aggression against all of the parties of the pact and, consequently, 
every state is lawfully entitled to act in self-defense (Article 3.1). Menezes argues that 
the document is inspired by the "Blum Doctrine" of solidarity among the American 
peoples, which, in turn, fundaments the common defense of the American continent 
against internal or foreign enemies (MENEZES, 2010, p. 149-150). The treaty was 
called upon by Argentina during the Malvinas (Falklands) conflict between the Latin-
American state and the United Kingdom. However, the United States of America 
sided with its Northern Atlantic ally. After the 9/11 attacks, Brazil evoked TIAR 
instead of signing bilateral treaties with the USA (some commentators justify the 
Brazilian decision on the well-known ineffectiveness of the treaty). Nevertheless, 
alongside other states, Mexico denounced TIAR in 2002 (ceasing to be in force 
concerning Mexico as of 2004) because the Americas did not have external threats 
that justified the treaty and, on the other hand, the internal instabilities suffered by the 
states were outside TIAR’s vocation (SENNES; ONUKI; OLIVEIRA, 2006).  
On September 11th, 2019, through a voting by the states that are still parties 
to TIAR, a Resolution was passed to establish the Agreement’s Organ of 
Consultation, to convene the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to inform 
the UNSC about all activities related to the Venezuelan crisis (OAS, 2019b). It is 
curious to point out that, through its Interim President Juan Guaidó, Venezuela is 
among the states favorable to the convocation of TIAR. Nevertheless, under 
concurrent President Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
released a statement in the same day denouncing the invocation of the treaty, stating 
that it was a “[…] despicable decision of a small group of governments of the region 
[…]", and pointing out that "[…] Venezuela will continue to adhere to the principles of 
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the Charter of the United Nations, respect for international law, the practice of 
multilateralism and peace diplomacy […]” (VENEZUELA, 2019). Moreover, the 
Venezuelan state had denounced TIAR in 2013; however, through Guaidó, it 
deposited the instruments of ratification of TIAR in August 2019 (OAS, 2019a).9 
Withal, concerning its legal content, TIAR is not an exception to the rules 
presented above regarding regional organizations. It mentions that every controversy 
will first undergo the procedures of the Inter-American System before referring it to 
the UNGA or the UNSC (Article 2), and, simultaneously, the treaty states that the 
member states will not resort to the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
provisions of the UN Charter (Article 1 of TIAR). Moreover, while it mentions that 
measures of self-defense may be taken until the UNSC has taken the procedures it 
deems necessary (Article 3.4), it also points out that, in conformity with Articles 51 
and 54 of the UN Charter, information on the activities undertaken will be 
immediately sent to the UNSC (Article 5 of TIAR). Hence, from a legal standpoint, 
TIAR must be interpreted and applied within the framework set by the UN Charter’s 
rules relating to the use of force by regional organizations. That is, the same 
conclusions regarding these organizations apply to actions under TIAR. 
 
5.3 THE VETO POWER OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
 
Moreover, there is an overarching difficulty concerning the raison d’être of 
R2P. In essence, R2P was created as an answer to the alleged failures of the 
international community to respond to humanitarian crises adequately. One of the 
significant deficiencies of timely action is arguably the procedure within the UNSC. 
This is to be expected given the central duties and responsibilities of the organ to 
maintain peace and international security and the veto powers of the permanent 
 
9 At the time of the writing of this paper, there are no further relevant developments on the Venezuelan 
situation and the potential usage of TIAR to justify a humanitarian intervention or any other measure. 
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members. Hence, it can be argued that R2P is created as an attempt to overcome 
the inherent complexities of the UNSC procedures and its potential failures. 
Following the genealogy of the Holy Alliance created during the Napoleonic 
Wars, the UN adopts a similar strategy, centralizing the most substantial economic 
and military forces at its time, it attempts to secure peace by preventing the 
resurgence of any political uprising capable of threatening the current order. 
Moreover, by concentrating the forces into one organization, it tries to balance power 
and, to a certain extent, ensure minimal cooperation between its leaders, attempting 
to avoid a new conflict. In the center of the UN, the UNSC emerges as a mechanism 
that aims to provide a stage for dialogue between the victors of the Second World 
War. In these terms, the UNSC is divided into permanent and non-permanent 
members.10 A segregation that challenges legal basis (KELSEN, 1946, p. 1118). 
Even if during the debates that preceded the formation of the UN the Soviet Union 
argued that the permanent five would have greater responsibilities when compared to 
the other participants (UNCIO, 1945, p. 351), these arguments are, at most, of a 
political nature. Considering the UN Charter as a legal document, there are no 
greater duties or responsibilities to a permanent member than to any of the other 
members of the UN (KELSEN, 1946, p. 1117). 
Be it as it may, the permanent members are lawfully empowered with what is 
called the “veto right”. The veto instrumentally allows any of the permanent members 
to halt any decision of the UNSC to be taken, given that the UN Charter requires 
decisions on procedural matters to be made by a unanimous affirmative vote of the 
permanent members. However, even non-procedural issues can be vetoed 
considering that the decision on a definition of what is a procedural or non-procedural 
matter is a procedural matter in itself and, thus, is subject to veto (double veto) 
(KELSEN, 1951, p. 239; CONFORTI, 2005, p. 69-71). The inevitable effect of the 
 
10  The permanent members, according to the UN Charter, are the People's Republic of China 
(formerly the Republic of China), France, the Russian Federation (formerly the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States 
of America. 
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voting procedure conferring the right of veto upon the permanent member is 
apparent. No decision can be taken against the will of one of these states, even if a 
permanent member is directly involved in the matter to which the decision refers 
(KELSEN, 1951, p. 265).  
The veto was the cause for many stalemates during the UNSC practice 
across the years, with its intensity diminishing after the end of the Cold War (DAG 
HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, 2017). However, from a legal standpoint, the veto 
power is still in effect; nothing stops it from being used, including when the Security 
Council is deciding matters concerning international peace and security 
(FREDERKING, 2007, p. 28; HURD, 2007, p. 191). Nonetheless, even if there are 
convincing arguments against it, the veto power is legal, i.e., valid, including the 
double veto mentioned above, which is recognized in the UN’s official repertory of 
practices (UN, 2016). Hence, from a strictly legal standpoint, there is nothing “wrong” 
with the use of veto rights by the permanent members of the UNSC. What R2P fails 
to consider is that a veto imposed or threatened is a sound legal practice under the 
UN Charter. Thus, if there is such a situation and, nonetheless, the UNGA or a 
regional organization still decides to carry on the usage of force, they will be 
disrespecting a valid UNSC decision. If a state is authorized to recommend the use 
of armed force — although some permanent members of the Council have voted 
against taking enforcement action measures because they considered that no threat 
to or breach of the peace existed — in practice, through R2P, that state acts as an 
“appeal court” to the UNSC. It does not seem that this is an adequate interpretation 
of the Charter’s rules concerning the use of force and veto powers.11  
There is a considerable difference between a deadlock between the 
permanent members of the UNSC and the usage of the veto power as an 
accountable exercise in restraint (WEBB, 2014). Take the failed USA attempts to 
convince the UNSC on authorizing the recourse to force against Iraq. The USA’s 
officials criticized the procedure, accusing the UN of failing to deal with the matter 
 
11 Kelsen presents a similar argument while criticizing the “Uniting for Peace” procedure (1951, p. 
977). 
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properly. Another interpretation is that the system did not fail. Rather, two-thirds of 
the UNSC concluded that — instead of the use of force — the appropriate measures 
would be to strengthen the in loco UN inspectors and to position more troops in the 
borders of Iraq to deter further defiance from Saddam Hussein (TAFT IV, 2003, p. 
557-558; FRANCK, 2006, p. 102-13).  
 
 
6  BETWEEN UNSC REFORM AND RULE DETERMINACY 
 
Despite the arguments presented above, it is impossible to ignore the 
intrinsic complexities and risks that are posed by the UNSC dispute settlement 
mechanism. An instrument that is legally susceptible to being “blocked” in cases 
where some of its members disagree will be unable to properly deal with situations of 
crisis resolving the disputes placed before it. After all, these are the most 
confrontational instances and, thus, even more susceptible to disagreements that, in 
turn, could lead to a veto that will prevent the matter of being adequately dealt with. 
Kelsen spoke about this issue very lucidly:  
 
 
The inevitable effect of the voting procedure conferring the right of veto upon 
each of the permanent members must be that no decision of any importance 
can be taken against the will of one of the privileged states even if this state 
is involved in the matter to which the decision refers. [...] Consequently, the 
Security Council sometimes will not be able to exercise its most essential 
functions, especially those referred to in Article 39. (KELSEN, 1951, p. 265)  
 
 
The UNSC mechanism is inherently problematic. One may even say that, by 
requiring the concurrent vote of its permanent members, unanimous agreement is 
needed and, thus, by itself, the procedure leaves room for an international dispute to 
remain unresolved. Furthermore, the fact that the veto blocked a solution does not 
mean that the dispute will not be dealt with in some way; the litigating parties may 
attempt to resolve this issue by other means that may perhaps be less than legal. In 
some way, this seems to be the case of R2P. Humanitarian crises are a grave issue, 
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and the international legal system based on the UN Charter does not present an 
adequate solution. Even if humanitarian interventions are a controversial answer to 
the problem at hand, R2P is an attempt to offer a solution. However, considering the 
aforementioned, R2P’s reasoning is not only debatable, it also seems to contradict 
the law in effect directly (the UN Charter). 
Thomas Franck has a series of investigations on the reasons why nations 
obey international law. (This theme goes far beyond the limitations of the research, 
given that it goes outside the legal scope of the analysis at hand. However, for the 
purposes herein, the author presents a relevant interpretation.) Considering the use 
of force in Iraq and Kosovo in disagreement with Article 2 of the UN Charter, some 
argue that states that violate the rights of their people and states that harbor terrorists 
are no longer entitled to the sovereign rights of territorial integrity (a similar 
interpretation to the one presented by R2P). These interpreters assert that the UN 
Charter must be interpreted in a light that corresponds to “the realities of international 
politics” (SIMPSON, 2004, p. 334). Franck, on the other hand, seems to disagree 
with this interpretation (FRANCK, 1990). Determinacy, according to Franck, is the 
literary-structural property of a norm whose content is readily ascertainable (1998, p. 
715). The text of Article 2 appears to be transparent enough for its content to be 
determinant. The use of force under contemporary international law is under a legal 
monopoly of the UNSC (even self-defense, as seen, is subject to being ratified by the 
Council’s decision). It is evident, however, that the Charter was written and approved 
under a different political paradigm. Circumstances, priorities, and values change. 
Substantive and procedural rules must also be adapted. The veto and the threat of a 
veto is a grave issue that has paralyzed the UNSC in the past and may return to 
usage, hindering appropriate action. However, “violations of treaties, and of universal 
treaties in particular, are no substitutes for legitimate amendments” (FRANCK, 2006, 
p. 93-94). 
UNSC reform is vital. Appropriate changes must be made to provide 
international tools that are appropriate in dealing with the risk of humanitarian crises. 
An alternate solution to a political mechanism such as the UNSC is, as argued by 
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Kelsen, an international court with compulsory jurisdiction (KELSEN, 1944). 
Conceivably adapting the statutes of the International Court of Justice or the 
International Criminal Court, or providing a creative interpretation of the law in effect 
to give them peremptory jurisdiction over these matters through the UNSC, might be 
an impartial (or at least non-political) alternative. Regardless, what seems to be sure 
is that at least one aspect of the Charter procedures must not change, be it through 
reform or reinterpretation of the law in effect. Similar to the argument presented by 
Franck (2006, p. 105), in a contemporary world of global interdependence, the basic 
notion that the case for the use of force must be submitted and accepted by a 
collegiate body, and not the individual state, is a necessity. Adopting an opposite 
path will relapse the international community into an even more primitive vendetta 
system. Foxes in charge of the henhouse; states deciding whether their own military 
dealings are legitimate.  
 
 
7  FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In this paper, the goal was to study the contemporary just war doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention through R2P in a strictly legal light, considering the just war 
doctrine in light of contemporary international law. At this point, this paper concludes 
that, if there is still a just war doctrine, it would be binary (legal or illegal). It must 
follow one of the situations contained in the Charter for the use of force to be legally 
valid. This conception is closely related to the next subject that was analyzed, the 
general framework for the use of force in the UN Charter. The conclusion is that there 
is a perceptive legal monopoly on the use of force through the UNSC. 
Based on this preliminary set of results, the paper analyzed R2P as a legal 
concept. (i) The conclusion is that R2P adopts a just war formula that disagrees with 
the rules set in the UN Charter for the use of force. R2P presents cases of violations 
of human rights, which it considers that justify the use of force in international 
relations even if there is no legislative gap in the UN Charter that allows this 
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interpretation. (ii) Moreover, R2P ignores that the UN Charter indicates the UNSC as 
the organ responsible for deciding over the use of force in international relations. In 
an attempt to interpret the “Uniting for Peace” procedure and rules concerning 
regional agreements, R2P ignores the legal limitations set in the UN Charter and 
even jus cogens norms concerning the prohibition on the use of force. (iii) 
Additionally, R2P can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome what could be 
considered failures in the UNSC’s procedure, particularly the use of veto rights by the 
permanent members of the organ. Again, the institute ignores that the veto rights are 
a legal mechanism set in the UN Charter and that by exercising it, the member is, in 
reality, making use of a valid instrument. 
In sum, this research concludes that R2P is a creative project that attempts 
to offer an interesting interpretation in international law trying to overcome some 
limitations which it considers undesirable. However, in a strictly legal analysis, R2P 
has several aspects that are open to questioning and criticism. Moreover, as 
presented, there are structural elements that are legally unsustainable. In this sense, 
regardless of political and moral beliefs, it is possible to point out that R2P presents 
grave legal deficiencies. There are many valuable arguments in favor of and against 
humanitarian intervention. The same goes for UN and UNSC reform (it is not possible 
to ignore the inherent complexities caused by the veto rights). Divergent views have 
the relevance of their own but, in a legal analysis, there is a difference between what 
is and what ought to be. Regardless of personal and collective beliefs, R2P is a 
relevant legal institute that has the power to affect world politics and, perhaps, even 
be recognized as an emerging international norm. However, at the current state, the 
ICISS proposal ignores fundamental rules of the basic norm of the international 
community, the UN Charter, and, as a consequence, the use of force through R2P is 
unlawful. 
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